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GA'IT MEMBERSHIP IN A CHANGING
WORLD ORDER:
TAIWAN, CHINA, AND THE
FORMER SOVIER REPUBLICS
0

LORI FISLER DAMROSCH

My introduction to questions of GATr1 membership came in
1979 when, as an attorney in the U.S. Department of State, I
was immersed in a series of issues concerning trade relations
with the People's Republic of China ("China" or "PRC") and
Taiwan ("Republic of China" or "ROC"). I kept hearing about
the "Chinese seat" in the GATr as if it were some piece of furniture waiting to be taken out of storage and put back in the
dining room. The image of a chair is hardly an apt way of visualizing the extraordinarily complex network of legal relationships that exists within the GATr, but the unfortunate metaphor persists. The People's Republic of China has applied to the
GATr to "resume the seat" that no one has sat in for more
than forty years, and a separate application from Taiwan leads
some to wonder whether there can be two "Chinese chairs" in
what seems to be a rather crowded banquet hall. With the
same imagery, questions are also being asked about the "Soviet
seat" on the U.N. Security Council and in other international
bodies.
Let's have an antique dealer cart off all the chairs so that
we can think sensibly and imaginatively about complex structures of legal relationships - within the GATr, with GATr
Contracting Parties in their evolving trade relations with China
and Taiwan, between China and Taiwan, within the disintegra-

• Professor of Law, Columbia University. The author gratefully acknowledges the research assistance of Lin Kuang-Hsiang of the Columbia Law School
(LL.M. 1989, J.D. expected 1992) and the National Taiwan University (LL.M.
1988, LL.B. 1984).
1
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30,
1947, 61 Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 (hereinafter "GA'IT").
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ting Soviet empire, and between the emergent ex-Soviet entities
and the rest of the world.
I would like to focus on a set of problems suggested by the
China-Taiwan-GATI' problem, but which also cut across a number of other relationships. These are the problems of inclusion
in the multilateral trading structure (GATI'-based) of entities
(not just "states," but a broader set of political units) that are
basically market-oriented or striving to be market-oriented, but
which stand in an unresolved political relationship with a giant
non-market economy ("NME"). Taiwan is of course the principal
example for purposes of today's conference, but we could also
include Hong Kong and Macao in the shadow of China, and
any number of entities in the shadow of the Soviet Union the three Baltic republics, other former Soviet republics struggling to sort out their political and economic future, and the
East European states which were formerly integrated into the
COMECON trading bloc and which are now trying to figure out
how to privatize their economies without suffering a complete
rupture of longstanding relationships within the former bloc.
This set of problems can illuminate a more basic issue that the
world community will have to face increasingly in the next few
years - the question of reconceptualizing participation in international organizations in a changing world. International organizations were created by "states" to serve the needs of "states,"
but pressures are mounting on the state system as we have
known it, and new solutions to novel questions will have to be
found.
In the first two parts of this paper I isolate the questions of
"Taiwan and the GATI'" and "non-market economies and the
GATI'." Then in the third part I take up the complications that
arise when the place in the GATI' system of a market-oriented
entity, such as Taiwan, cannot be isolated from that entity's
political relationship with a major non-market economy.
I. TAIWAN

AND THE

GATI'

Without attempting to review in detail the history and legal
issues which other participants in this conference will undoubtedly examine more fully, I will identify a few key features of
the Taiwan-GATI' problem.
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A. The History of China and the GATI'
The Republic of China was a founding member of the GATI'.
It participated in the original negotiations in 1947 and became
party to the Protocol of Provisional Application which came into
force in early 1948.2 In the aftermath of the October · 1949
Communist takeover of the mainland, the ROC government,
from its new base on Taiwan, gave notice of withdrawal from
the GATI' in 1950.3 This withdrawal was one of a series of actions taken by the ROC government at about the same time,
with respect to membership in international organizations. For
example, the ROC gave the requisite one year's notice of denunciation of the Convention on International Civil Aviation on
May 31, 1950; despite a few grumblings from certain parties
that the ROC lacked legal authority to denounce the Convention, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) gave
effect to the denunciation, and also recognized a subsequent
ROC decision to res\lfile its ICAO membership on January 1,
1954.4
The attitude of the People's Republic at this time was that
the ROC should be expelled from all international organizations. 5 Voluntary withdrawal on the part of the ROC may have
been a preemptive move in order to obviate a debate over expulsion, or it may have been motivated by other considerations,
such as a conclusion that the ROC did not wish to bear the

2

The General Agreement itself, in its preambular paragraph~ identifies "the
Republic of China" as one of the original Contracting Parties. Id.
3
GATI' Doc. CP/54 (Mar. 8, 1950). The history of withdrawal is summarized in H. JACOBSON & M. 0KSENBERG, CHINA'S PARl'ICIPATION IN THE IMF,
THE WORLD BANK, AND GATI' at 59·63 (1990)(hereinafter JACOBSON &
OKSENBERG), and in Herzstein, China and the GATI': Legal and Policy Issues
Raised by China's Participation in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
18 L. & POL'Y IN INT'L Bus. 371, 402-04 (1986).
4
For history and analysis of the !CAO developments, see T. BUERGENTHAL,
LAW-MAKING IN THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION 35-38 (1969).
6
See J. COHEN & H. CHIU, PEOPLE'S CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 30910 (1974); BUERGENTHAL, supra note 4, at 37. In August of 1950, in a cable to
the International Monetary Fund, Zhou Enlai demanded expulsion of Taiwan's
appointees from the annual meeting of the Fund's board of governors; the same
year (and in several subsequent years) Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and India
sponsored unsuccessful resolutions that would have expelled Taiwan's designees
at the Fund. JACOBSON & 0KSENBERG, supra note 3, at 59-60.
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financial and other obligations of participation in these organizations. 6 Whatever the motivation, there is no indication that
the PRC contested the legality· of the withdrawals at the relevant time - that is, in the early 1950's, contemporaneously
with the events. Nor did the PRC attempt to assume the "Chinese seats" in these organizations or to observe the legal obligations of the international agreements associated with the organizations.7 Only decades later, when the PRC began to see potential benefits in occupying a "seat" that had long since been
removed from the table, did the notion surface that the 1950
withdrawals might have been somehow unauthorized or without
legal effect.8 Surely there is no merit to this claim. The time to
raise any question of the legality of termination of Chinese
membership was in the early 1950's; the claim is now foreclosed not only by virtue of the PRC's failure to assert it at the
relevant time, but also by the PRC's failure to undertake and
observe the obligations of membership in the 1950's or indeed
at any subsequent time.
The legal situation concerning the relationship of both the
ROC and the PRC to the GATT is thus clear: there has been
no Chinese "seat" since 1950.9 The eligibility of China or Tai-

6

With respect to !CAO, Buergenthal's account supports the latter theory:
the ROC negotiated with the organization in 1953-54 concerning its fmancial
arrearages and upon resolution of those difficulties was permitted to rejoin
!CAO by becoming once again a party to the Convention. BUERGENTHAL, supra
note 4, at 37.
7
COHEN & CHIU, supra note 5, at 299, 310; BUERGENTHAL supra note 4, at
37. Buergenthal speculates that the PRC "might have been unwilling, for military reasons, to assume the obligations incumbent upon Contracting States
under the [Civil Aviation] Convention, or it may well have believed that its
attempts to join the Organization would be unsuccessful." Id.
8
See generally Herzstein, supra, note 3 at 402-406; Li Chung·chou, Re·
sumption.of China's GAIT Membership, 21 J. WORLD TRADE L. 25 (1987); Feng
Yu-shu, China's Membership of GAIT: A Practical Proposal, 22 J. WORLD
TRADE L. 53 (1988).
9
The Taiwan government had an observer position from 1965 to 1971. See
JACOBSON & 0KSENBERG, supra note 3 at 63; J. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING
SYSTEM 288 (1989) (hereinafter THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM).
In April of 1980 China "resumed" its seat on the U.N.'s Interim Commission
for the International Trade Organization, a vestigial body whose sole current
function is to appoint the GA'IT secretariat. In this capacity China has partici·
pated in the selection of GA'IT personnel, including the incumbent director•
general, Arthur Dunkel. See JACOBSON & 0KSENBERG, supra note 3 at 83-84.
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wan for GATI' membership, or the authority of any government
purporting to represent either one in a quest for GATI' membership, must therefore be examined de novo. As long as everyone understands that what is involved is a fresh start, the
choice of terminology in the documents eventually establishing
a new legal relationship can be made in accordance with political preferences. No harm will be done if the GATI' contracting
parties defer to Beijing's insistence on the term "resumption"
instead of "accession."
The legal situation with respect to GATI' is independent of
the question of Chinese membership in the United Nations. As
is well known, the ROC government continued to represent China at the United Nations until 1971; in October 1971 the General Assembly voted to allow the PRC to assume the Chinese
"seat" in the United Nations, including the permanent seat on
the Security Council. 1 Following the lead of the U.N.'s principal political ·organs, the specialized agencies of the United Nations and other U.N. organs 11 have "seated" the PRC .:..... provided, of course, that the PRC has been ready and willing to
assume the responsibilities of membership. But this political-

°

China has become party to GA'IT's Multifibre Arrangement, and by virtue of
a decision of GA'IT's contracting parties has been permitted to participate in
the Uruguay Round negotiations. Id. at 84, 94.
10
G.A. Res. 2758, 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 29) at 2, U.N. Doc. A,18429
(1972). The current turmoil in the Soviet Union has precipitated interest in all
arguably relevant precedents for allocating Security Council "seats" in the event
of dramatic change in the political situation of one of the permanent members.
Of interest is the fact that the U.N. Charter specifies in article 23 that the
Security Council's permanent members shall include the "Republic of China."
This choice of term did not preclude the United Nations from de-accrediting the
representatives of the government using that name and accepting the credentials of the representatives of the government of the People's Republic.
11
A unique international institution is the International Court of Justice,
which is the "principal judicial organ of the United Nations" (U.N. CHARTER,
art. 92). It had no member of Chinese nationality from 1967 (end of term of
Judge Wellington Koo of the ROC) until 1985 (beginning of term of Judge Ni
Zhengyu of the PRC). Purists will note that judges of the Court do not represent governments (therefore, there is no "Chinese seat"), but since the Security
Council participates in the election of judges it is not merely a coincidence that
the nationalities of judges generally reflect the geographic distribution of the
Security Council.

24
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legal fact within the U.N. system is simply irrelevant to the
GATI', because the GATI' is not a U.N. agency. 12

B. Current Problems of Law and Policy
In January of 1990 Taiwan applied for GATI' membership.
In a clever move aimed at avoiding the issue of Taiwan's political status, its application purports to be on behalf of the "Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu. "13 This
formulation appears to be consistent with Article XXXIII of the
GATI', which allows applications for membership to be filed by
"governments" in the traditional sense, and also by "a government acting on behalf of a separate customs territory possess·
ing full autonomy in the conduct of its external commercial
relations and of the other matters provided for in this Agreement."14 Functionally, Taiwan does possess such autonomy,
and the authorities in Taiwan do function as the government
acting on its behalf.
One may of course quibble over the meaning of the term
"government" in Article XXXIII, or over any number of other
arcane issues of the drafting of the provisions of the General
Agreement and related instruments covering membership and
similar issues, 15 but in my view the functional realities should
prevail and there should be no legal obstacle to Taiwan's admission as a "separate customs territory."
Before leaving these legal technicalities I would note the ap·
plicability of a different article, Article XXVI(5), to Hong Kong's
situation. Article XXVI(5)(a) provides in part that a government
accepting the Agreement does so "in respect of its metropolitan
territory and of the other territories for which it has interna-

12
For detailed discussion of the evolution of the PRC's relationship with the
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, see JACOBSON & OKSENBERO,
supra note 3. Concerning Taiwan and international financial institutions; see
Damrosch, The Taiwan Relations Act After Ten Years, 3 J. CHINESE LAW 157,
179-80 (1989).
13
See WuDunn, Taiwan's Chances Rising for World Trade Status, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 29, 1991, at A21.
14
GATT, supra note 1, Article XXXIII.
.
15
E.g., the relationship of Article XX.XIII to Article XXVI, discussed in the
next paragraph of the text, and the relationship of the General Agreement's
final clauses to the Protocol of Provisional Application, infra note 18, and other
GATT instruments.
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tional responsibility,"16 and Article XXVI(5)(c) provides a
mechanism under which territories possessing or acquiring full
autonomy in external commercial· relationships "shall, upon
sponsorship through a declaration by the responsible Contracting Party establishing the above-mentioned fact, be deemed to
be a Contracting Party."17 Without attempting to parse all the
intricacies of these and related provisions in their application to
the triangular United Kingdom-Hong Kong-PRC relationship, 18
I would simply note that the articles invoked by Taiwan and
Hong Kong respectively are different and not legally interchangeable. The functional significance of the legal difference is
that for the reasons previously given in Part I.A, Taiwan's application is de nouo and requires negotiation of a new protocol
of accession to be approved by a two-thirds majority of the
GATI' Contracting Parties. Hong Kong, in contrast, has enjoyed
continuity of membership by virtue of its legal relationship with
its current metropolitan power, the United Kingdom, which
sponsored Hong Kong for membership in its own right; no new
protocol was required to consummate this change in status.
Interestingly, the PRC supplied the GAIT with confirmation
that Hong Kong will continue to possess full autonomy in its
external commercial relations after the change in its political
status takes effect in 1997; 19 Beijing was content with this formula for continuation of Hong Kong's GATI' participation because of the acknowledgment of the PRC's sovereignty over
Hong Kong (an element which the pending application on behalf of Taiwan clearly does not satisfy). Accordingly, "Hong
Kong China" became the 91st member of the GATI' in April of
1986. (Prospects for the Hong Kong-PRC-GATI' relationship,
and comparisons to potential future Taiwan-PRC-GATI' relationships, are dealt with in Part III below.)
Macao, like Hong Kong, has been and remains an overseas
territory of a European power (Portugal), and will revert to

16

GATI', supra note 1, Article XXVI (5)(a).
GATI', supra note 1, Article XXVI (5)(c).
18
E.g., Paragraph 2 of the Protocol of Provisional Application of the GATI',
61 Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187, 308 (concerning provisional
application in respect of territories other than metropolitan territories).
19
See Hong Kong Joins GA'IT; Separate Membership to Continue Even
Under Chinese Sovereignty, 3 INT'L TRADE REP., No. 18, at 581 (Apr. 30, 1986);
Li Chung·chou, supra note 8, at 43-44.
17
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Chinese control on a known future date (1999). Macao became
the 101st member of the GATI' in January of 1991, on the
same basis as Hong Kong. 20
,
On the merits - that is, viewing the trade policy questions
independently of political or legal considerations - there is no
question that the world trading system would benefit from
bringing Taiwan into the GATI'. Taiwan's application stresses
that it is a major economic power, arguably the 13th largest
trading power in the world. 21 Its export volume has typically
exceeded that of the PRC, and on the basis of most economic
indicators it is world-class. 22 Even more important than Taiwan's economic strength is the value to GATI' parties, and indeed to Taiwan itself, of bringing Taiwan under GATI' discipline. For so long as Taiwan remains outside GATT's framework of legal obligation and multilateral scrutiny, the only constraint on Taiwan's trading practices is the' potential for retaliation on the part of trading partners that might unilaterally
deem themselves aggrieved. Subsidies, dumping, market disruption, protectionist practices with respect to imports and foreign
investment, misappropriation of intellectual property - all
these, and more, have been problems in Taiwan's trade relations. 23 Unilateral retaliation or threats of retaliation, as
under the U.S. "Super-301" procedures, are no substitute for
multilateral supervision of Taiwan's trading practices and responsive action within the multilateral structure.
II. NON-MARKET ECONOMIES AND THE GATI'
In this section I will take up some considerations concerning
the GATI' relationship with economies that are not structured
on market principles - China being the most pertinent example. It is worth underscoring that Taiwan, despite a strong
state sector and considerable state influence over private eco-

20

See Taiwan Revising Membership Bid in Light of Recent, Less Favorable
Trade Statistics, 8 lNT'L TRADE REP, at 175 (Jan. 30, 1991).
21
Id. Whether it is the 13th or the 16th or even the 25th is not material;
the point is that it is not on the fringes of world trade but instead vigorously
involved in it.
22
For a table showing ten years of key economic indicators, see Damrosch,
supra note 12 at 162.
23
Id. at 164-67.
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nomic ~ctivity, is basically market-oriented, both internally and
externally.24 The objections to Taiwan's bid for membership in
the GATT are almost exclusively political and have nothing to
do with the substantive economic concerns about the potential
GATT membership of countries that are ideologically committed
to central control of economic activity. It is to those concerns
that we now turn.
For the reasons that have been developed in Part I, the matter of Chinese membership in GATT has had to be taken up
from scratch, starting from the mid-1980's when China first
began to express serious interest. Of paI"amount importance is
China's situation as a gigantic non-mai-ket economy (NME):
· despite some experiments with limited private enterprise, the
economy has been basically directed from the center and not
organized on market principles. China may complain, but the
GATT Contracting Parties must reckon with this fact of life in
deciding whether to admit China to membership and if so, on
what terms.
By the late 1980's, with China pressing for GATT membership and the Soviet Union beginning to express interest, considerable attention was being given to the difficult policy questions
for the GATT attendant upon the possible incorporation into
the GATT system of these two vast NME's. It may be convenient to consider these questions in two phases, with late 1989
as the dividing point in light of the collapse of Communist ideology in Europe at about that time, and to differentiate between the problems of "big NME's" (China and the USSR), 25
and "little NME's" (most of the East European countries, and
potentially some of the smaller Soviet republics).
A. NME's and the GATT Through 1989
GATT Contracting Parties have justifiable concerns about
NME's with respect to both import and export trade. 26 As re-

24

Id. at 164 n. 29.
To the extent that the legacy of non-market structure can be expected to
persist for some time, similar problems would be posed if Russia, or a new
grouping of former Soviet republics including Russia, should apply for GATT
membership.
26
For a succinct overview, see THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 9,
at 283-98.
25

28
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gards imports into NME's, tariff concessions from an NME
could be rendered meaningless by virtue of arbitrary or manipulative pricing decisions made by state authorities; and prohibitions on quotas could be eva<;Jed by central decisions to limit
orders of imported goods. Concerning the exports of NME's, the
absence of market pricing makes judgments concerning sales at
less than fair value especially elusive, and the concept of subsidies seems virtually meaningless when applied to a centrally
planned economy.27 Moreover, NME's are perceived as being
able to target their exports in ways that threaten disruption of
existing markets. For all these and other reasons, GATr Contracting Parties have been wary about treating NME entry as a
simple matter of claiming a "seat"; elaborate negotiations have
been required to set terms and conditions of participation in
the system.
Some half-dozen NME's have so far joined the GATr, as follows:28
Country
Cuba
Czechoslovakia
Yugoslavia
Poland
Romania

Hungary

Year of
GAIT Entry Mode of Entry
1948
Original Entrant
1948
Original entrant
1966
Normal accession
1967
Protocol requiring annual import
increase of 7%.
1971
Protocol requiring increase in
imports from GA'IT CP's at rate
proportional to total import
growth.
1973
Protocol with normal schedule of
concessions and some special
terms.

27
See Horlick & Shuman, Non-Market Economy Trade and U.S. Antidumping/Counteruailing Duty Law, 18 INT'L LAW. 807 (1984).
28
The following chart is adapted from THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra

note 9, at 287. In addition, Bulgaria and China have observer status and their
applications for full membership are pending. The USSR has had observer
status since 1990.
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Basically, the GATI' system has been able to accommodate
these small NME's with some glitches but without any insuperable difficulties. 29 There is a modest literature on the experience of these NME's in the GATI'; 30 and the lessons learned
from the GATI"s efforts to iron out the problems of their participation would be relevant to planning for the potential future
participation of other NME's.31
The issues raised by the bids of China and the USSR for
GATI' membership are of a substantially different order, however. Even if the GATI' has been able to manage the smaller
NME's satisfactorily, the prognosis is not necessarily the same
for the big NME's. Would these countries really be willing and
able to integrate into the world trading system in a way that
will promote global welfare and efficiency? Or do they want to
join the system in order to exploit it - or worse, to destroy it?
It is not irrational to be skeptical about the motivations of
these two behemoths, and to demand enforceable assurances
that they would conduct their international trade in a manner
consistent with the letter and spirit of GAT!'. 32

29
But cf. JACOBSON & 0KSENBERG, supra note 3, at 39 ("Hardly any knowledgeable official or observer claimed that the arrangements that had been made
for the participation of Eastern European countries with communist governments in GA'IT had proved satisfactory ..."). This passage could mean either
that there is room for improvement in relations of the smaller NME's with the
GA'IT, or that the arrangements would be an unsuitable model for China's case.
Both of these positions could be valid, and neither is necessarily inconsistent
with the claim made in the text.
30
See, e.g., Patterson, Improving GATI' Rules for Nonmarket Economies, 20
J. WORLD TRADE L. 185 (1986); Lansing & Rose, The Granting and Suspension

of Most-Favored-Nation Status for Nonmarket Economy States: Policy and
Consequences, 25 HARV. INT'L L. J. 329 (1984); Grzybowski, Socialist Countries
in GATT, 28 .AM. J. COMP. L. 539 (1980).
31
An important criticism (made by Herzstein, supra note 3, and Patterson,
supra note 30, among others) is that certain features of the protocols of accession of the small NME's, such as import commitments fixed with reference to
the NME's five-year plan, had the undesirable effect of reinforcing state control
and discouraging decentralization.
32
Jacobson and Oksenberg are optimistic based on their assessment of
China's experiences with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank,
but they acknowledge that there have been rough aspects to the relationships;
moreover, the events of June 1989 in China caution against assuming that past
trends are necessarily good predictors for the future. JACOBSON & OKSENBERG,
supra note 3, at 129-39, 152-64.

30
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Of course, even if the complex questions of the entry of China and the USSR into the GATT could be satisfactorily resolved
on economic grounds, delicate political questions have complicated the situation further. GATT Contracting Parties have had
to take account of China's sensitivities with respect to Taiwan,
thus precluding either application from being addressed purely
on the merits. China's demand for the special trade preferences
accorded to developing countries raises political and legal complications, especially for the United States.33 Furthermore,
there are jealousies between China and the USSR, as well as
fallout from dramatic political events within each country, especially the Tiananmen Square massacre of June 4, 1989 and the
changing fortunes of Soviet President Gorbachev.
As of the end of the 1980's, eventual resolution of the economic and political obstacles to full GATT membership on the
part of both China and the USSR seemed to be a matter of
time rather than of principle. China had been accorded observer
status in the GATT in 1986 and negotiations toward full membership had covered considerable ground. In December of 1989,
at a summit meeting between Presidents Bush and Gorbachev,
the United States agreed to support GATT observer status for
the Soviet Union, 34 a step which was widely perceived as intended to lead in due course to full GATT membership.
Before turning to the 1990's, it is appropriate to take note of
an important contribution to the literature on NME's and the
GATT by the leading U.S. scholar of GATT law, John H. Jackson, writing at the turn of the decade. After summarizing the
competing positions on whether NME's can be successfully accommodated within the GATT system, Jackson articulated his
own position:
I feel that the GA'IT, or some structure related to it, should be
designed to be "universal" in orientation, and thus to accommodate all types of economies. One of the reasons for this goes back
to the fundamental notion of the Bretton Woods system, i.e., the

33
Concerning U.S. law on preferences for developing countries with refer·
ence to both Taiwan and the PRC, see Damrosch, supra note 12, at 163.
34
The GATT Council granted observer status to the USSR in May of 1990,
and in 1991 the USSR was admitted to the Import Licensing and Antidumping
Committees. See Soviet Union Access to Antidumping Committee Another Step
Toward Full Membership in GATI', 8 INT'L TRADE REP. at 696 (May 8, 1991).
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prevention of war, which in the economic context means embracing and establishing an institutional structure by which at least
major powers of the world can try to iron out their differences. 35

He rejected the view that GATI' countries should use leverage
over the admission decision to pressure NME's to become more
market-oriented:
It is not the purpose or role of the GA'IT to apply pressures on
sovereign nations to accept market-oriented economic principles.
The internal structure of a country's market should be left to
that country's own judgment, as along as its practices do not
harm other countries.36

Jackson went on to suggest elaboration of a system of specific
new provisions on a "two-track basis," under which NME's
would follow all the basic rules of GATI' but market economies
would be able to invoke special procedures if they believed that
they were being injured by virtue of state-trading practices of
an NME: "The advantage of a two-track approach is that it is
relatively self-adjusting to the extent of market-economy principles followed in the new NME. It is not based on a policy of
GA'IT pressure to marketize the economy."37 Instead of using
GATI' to change the NME's, "it can be argued strongly that the
GATI' has a responsibility to change and to figure out an appropriate way to accommodate the different economic systems."38
Jackson's thesis was controversial when written and has
become even more so in light of intervening developments,
which will be taken up in the next section. In opposition to his
view were the contentions that the large NME's would wreck
the GATI', or at least divert its attention from the urgent tasks
of reducing trade barriers and bringing greater discipline to
trade between the major markets in the Americas, Europe, Japan, and the newly industrialized Asian countries; and that if
NME's were to be admitted at all, maximum concessions toward

35

J.JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATI'_SYSTEM, at 82-83 (1991) (hereinafter RESTRUCTURING); see also WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 9, at 290.
36
RESTRUCTURING, supra note 35, at 85.
37
RESTRUCTURING, supra note 35, at 86-87; WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra
note 9, at 290-92.
33
WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 9, at 290.
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marketization should be exerted as conditions of admission.
Jackson had no reason at the end of the 1980's to question the
assumption that for the foreseeable future, the world would
remain divided between basically capitalist and basically Marxist-Leninist economies, which would have to coexist somehow.
On this assumption, his approach, under which the GATr
would become a forum for "interface" between economies constructed on radically different principles, was entirely reasonable.

B. NME's and the GATr in the 1990's
How has the end of the Cold War changed the situation for
NME's and the GATI'? Arguably, China's situation has changed
but little, or not at all. But for Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union, everything has changed. With the headlong rush to privatize the economies of Eastern Europe, the concept of ''nonmarket economy" should soon become an anachronism in that
region. In addition to the small, now-transitional NME's indicated on the preceding chart, the former German Democratic
Republic is now within the GATr system by virtue of its integration into the Federal Republic of Germany (and thereupon
into the European Communities).39 The turmoil in the former
Soviet Union has derailed consideration of its application for
full GATr membership, but one may confidently predict that
once the political situation has settled down, either the Union if
it survives, or many of its republics if it does not, will soon be
pressing for speedy negotiations for full accession.
Jackson's contention that the GATr admission process should
not be used to ·press market reforms upon NME's has been
overtaken by events in Europe. The question is no longer one of
"interface" between systems that are expected to remain different forever, but of transforming Europe's NME's into market
economies as rapidly and successfully as possible. The transitional NME's urgently require and request technical assistance
from Western experts and international economic organizations

39

Giegerich, The European Dimension of German Reunification: East Germany's Integration into the European Communities, 51 ZEITSCHRIFI' FUR
AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT 384 (1991).
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in the marketization of their economies. It would be unthinkable for GATI' to pass up this opportunity.
By analogy to the process under which the small NME's enjoyed something of a tutorial in the principles of world trade
pursuant to their protocols of accession to the GATI', new terms
of accession can be negotiated for the several long-standing
East European members of the GATI'. New relationships can
likewise be established with those transitional NME's that have
not yet become GATI' members - notably Bulgaria,40 and presumably in due course the three Baltic states and possibly other Soviet republics as well.
China is the sole surviving major country ideologically committed to a Communist model of economic organization (leaving
aside Cuba, North Korea, and a few other countries whose role
in world trade is insignificant). It is a fair question, however,
whether that ideological commitment will continue after the
ruling generation passes from the scene - indeed, whether that
commitment could be sustained in any event, in view of internal and external pressures toward marketization and decentralization. The next Part will explore the possibility that a growing web of GATI' relations incorporating small parts of greater
China - Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao - could build momentum for market-oriented changes even if the larger part of
China remains outside the GATI' for the time being.

III.

CHANGING POLITICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN MARKET AND
NON-MARKET ECONOMY COUNTRIES:

GATI' AS A FACTOR
The unresolved political relationship between Taiwan and the
PRC poses challenging problems for the GATI' and GATI' Contracting Parties. Not the least of the problems is the intrusion
of extraneous factors into a process that ought to be governed
more by economic than by political considerations. The notion is
bandied about that China has "vetoed" Taiwan's application or
"blocked" it from even being considered.41 Any lawyer would

40

Bulgaria's application for GATI' membership has been pending since

1988.
41
See, e.g., China Takes Early Action to Block Taiwan's GA'IT Membership
Application, 7 INT'L TRADE REP. at 131 (Jan. 24, 1990).
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find this use of language imprecise, for the GATr (unlike the
United Nations) has no big-power veto, and a fortiori no nonparty veto. Moreover, there is something quite odd (to this lawyer, anyway) about an exercise in legal interpretation under
which an agreement's provision concerning an entity "possessing
full autonomy in the conduct of its external commercial relations" could be deprived of a logical, practical construction in
obeisance to the political dogma of a non-party to the agreement. It is for the GATr Contracting Parties, not for the PRC,
to judge whether Taiwan enjoys "full autonomy" within the
meaning of this provision of their constitutive document. One
would be hard-pressed to fmd a single respect in which the
PRC can control Taiwan's conduct in the matters covered by
the GATr, and it therefore runs contrary to sound legal interpretation to give the PRC control over the entire Taiwan-GATr
relationship.
Some believe that once the PRC obtains favorable resolution
of its own bid for membership, it would be, willing to see Taiwan admitted on the same basis as Hong Kong and Macao. If
everything were on track for a speedy disposition of the PRC's
own situation, this approach might have some pragmatic appeal.42 But if there is reason for concern that either economic
or political reasons might delay consideration of the PRC's
claim for a prolonged period, then it would be economically
irrational and legally unwarranted to put Taiwan's application
on hold indefinitely. The absurdity of this sequencing can be
illustrated with a reminder that in the cases of Hong Kong and
Macao, the PRC declared in parallel to the sponsoring colonial
powers that these entities would remain autonomous. Does it
make sense for the Contracting Parties to refuse to reach their
own conclusion that Taiwan is autonomous - in deference to
the PRC's insistence that "Taiwan is a part of China" - while
awaiting the PRC's own incantation of the magic words that
Taiwan enjoys "full autonomy?" If Taiwan is factually and le-

42
The Working Party set up by the GA'IT to review China's application
resumed its work from February 13 to February 14, 1992 in Geneva. This is the
i!l'st time that the Working Party has met since its work was suspended in
1990 in the aftermath of the Tiananman bloodshed. See GATI' to Reuiew China,
USA Today, Feb. 8, 1992, at lOA; Shi, GATI' Working Party on China Holds
Tenth Meeting, People's Daily, Feb. 14, 1992, at 7.
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gally autonomous, then the Contracting Parties I\eed not wait
for the PRC to ackno;wledge that state of affairs.
This is not to say that the PRC's affirmation of continued
autonomy would be meaningless, only that it is not a legal
prerequisite in Taiwan's case. In the cases of Hong Kong and
Macao, the declaration was an important commitment in view
of the interests of the GATT Contracting Parties in ensuring
that the two territories not be submerged into China's non-market system. I would characterize the declarations as going beyond a political pledge to constitute an undertaking of legal
obligation;43 any interference with the autonomy of these two
units after their change in status would presumably be actionable within the framework of the GATT. 44 In the absence of
some dramatic change- in the Taiwan-PRC relationship - at
either of the two extremes of hostile takeover or negotiated
rapprochement - it is not clear that the PRC would have sufficient influence over Taiwan to constitute the kind of threat to
autonomy that was a real concern in the cases of Hong Kong
and Macao.
As 1997 and 1999 draw near, it becomes increasingly within
the realm of possibility that the PRC will still be outside the
GATT system while Hong Kong and Macao (and perhaps Taiwan) are inside it.45 There is no precise precedent for this situation; the reverse situation, under which a GATT Contracting
Party can notify the GATT that it excepts certain of its autonomous territories from the system, is more consistent with GATT
expectations, as evidenced by Article XXVI(5)(a). Yet despite the
absence of, precedent, there is no legal or logical objection to
having autonomous bits of a big country within GATT. An argument can be made that that state of affairs could serve the

43

Cf. Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), 1974 I.C.J. 253, 267; (New Zealand v. France), 1974 I.C.J. 457, 472 (unilateral declaration by one state treated
as creating a binding obligation even without a quid pro quo).
44
Remedies would be comparable to those applied in the case of any breach
of undertakings under the GATT and GATT-related agreements, with the
unusual twist that in the event that China remains in non-member status at
the time of the dispute, the issue would arise as to whether retaliatory measures would apply to Hong Kong (or Macao) only, or whether sanctions could be
directed against China as a whole.
45
JACOBSON & OKSENBERG, supra note 3, speculate about this possibility,
noting that "the senior part would be outside the system." Id. at 101-02.
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long-range objective of influencing China itself in the direction
of market reforms.
In making that argument, I must distance myself from John
Jackson's position that it is inappropriate for GATI' to be used
to induce a country to change its economic system.46 Whatever
the merits of that argument from the vantage point of the
1980's (indeed, I might have endorsed it myself then), it seems
clearly out of line with the trends of the 1990's. And in any
event, even if one were to continue in the belief that "GATI'" as
an organization should not press countries toward dramatic
changes in their governing ideology or political economy, the
considerations for U.S. policy are not similarly constrained. For
decades U.S. policy has sought to encourage China in pluralization, liberalization, and privatization,47 and the justifications
for continuing that encouragement are even stronger in the
post-Cold War era than before. Thus the question is not whether to abandon longstanding strategic objectiyes, but whether
GATI' relationships should be used as one tactic for the United
States to pursue in furtherance of those objectives. I believe
that the answer must be in the affirmative.
An element in the current debate over U.S. policy toward
China is the usage of most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment as
a technique of influence over China. In a recent article, Secretary of State James A. Baker III responded to those who would
revoke or place conditions on Iv1FN in reaction to China's human rights practices:
MFN has been a critical catalyst in the growth of our bilateral
ties .... MFN has also facilitated development of a large market-oriented sector - in Guangdong province it now exceeds the
state sector. This engagement has led to the integration of
China's coastal provices with Hong Kong, Taiwan and the global
economy. 48

Although the present paper is not the place to attempt to marshall empirical data in support of these provocative factual

46

Text at notes 35-38, supra.
During the Cold War we had "isms;" the favorite post-Cold War coinage
seems to be "izations," as in "decentralization" and "marketization."
48
Baker, America in Asia, 70 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 1, at 16 (Winter 199]/92).
47

,
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premises, they are consistent with reports from other· sources. 49
If Secretary Baker's conclusions about the effect of MFN on
China's evolution toward markets are correct, then it would
seem to follow that multilateralizing MFN through the GATr
should strengthen the effect. Application of leverage in favor of
market reforms at the point of the decision on China's GATr
entry could further increase the trend. Thus I favor the eventual incorporation of China into the GATr system, provided that
the GATI' Contracting Parties can obtain satisfactory assurances of China's willingness to conduct its foreign trade in accordance with GATI' principles.
Pending receipt of those assurances, it would be appropriate
to move forward with Taiwan's application forthwith, not only
for the benefits to Taiwan and the world trading system, but
also for the ancillary effect on greater China. It is my belief
that adding Taiwan to Hong Kong and Macao as GATI' members would hasten China's moves toward market orientation,
because it would tighten the integration among Pacific trading
partners. China's coastal provinces, and indeed China as a
whole, could not remain unaffected by these trends. While I do
not go so far as the suggestion that some in the United States
may have a hidden agenda favoring dismemberment of
China, 50 I do believe that the prospects for liberalization in
China can be strengthened by building the momentum for economic integration in the Pacific region.
For similar reasons I would bring the fragments of the former Soviet empire into the GATI' just as quickly as protocols
can be negotiated embodying assurances of their commitment to

49
See, e.g., Kristof, Hard Line in Beijing Fails to Kill Boom, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 17, 1991, at AlO ("Most of [China's] growth now is coming from private
and collective enterprises, not from the state-owned behemoths. . . . The state
sector accounts for only about one-third of China's gross national product
.'').
60
See Gelb, Breaking China Apart, N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1991, at A25
(reading the passage from Baker's Foreign Affairs article quoted above to suggest that "instead of China eventually absorbing Taiwan and Hong Kong, as
now prescribed in various solemn agreements, the exact opposite could happen
- Taiwan and Hong Kong could absorb the southern tier of China. . . . [T]he
southern provinces and Hong Kong ... could become so attached to the outside
world that they will refuse to be treated as a part of China. And along with
Taiwan . . . they could all demand self-determination.'').
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the principles of free trade. It would be natural to complete the
integration of all of Eastern Europe into the GA'IT and quickly
add the three Baltic republics, which were admitted to membership in the United Nations and the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe in September of 1991. As for the other
12 republics, it remains to be seen how they will resolve the
current confusion over internal and external economic policy,
but once these basic decisions are taken, .GA'IT accession
should follow promptly with respect to any entity committed to
free trade. If a viable commonwealth emerges with sufficient
authority to create a "common economic space," GA'IT may be
able to draw on its experiences with the European Community
to fashion pragmatic solutions to the complex problems that
arise when multiple levels of government have responsibility for
substantive issues.51
IV. CONCLUSION
GA'IT's framers were prescient in devising formulas for par·
ticipation going beyond "states" or "governments" in the classic
sense. What motivated them in 1947 was the concern to provide
for a workable approach to decolonization, but their pragmatic
solution, focusing on functional autonomy rather than formalistic legal constructs, fits well with the realities of Taiwan's situation today. Other international agreements and organizations,
based on more rigid formulations, can be expected to come under pressure for change as the state system itself changes. The
GA'IT model is not the only one, but it has much to recommend it.

51
See, e.g., Petersmann, The EEC as a GATI' Member, in THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNI'IY AND THE GA'IT at 23 (1986).

